FaSe: Fast Selective Flushing to Mitigate Contention-based Cache Timing Attacks
TimeWednesday, July 13th10:30am - 10:53am PDT
Location3006, Level 3
Event Type
Research Manuscript
Hardware Security: Attack and Defense
DescriptionCache timing channels in modern processors can be exploited from one process to gain access to data from a previous process by unauthorized access to residual data. While cache flush is effective in protecting against cache timing attacks, it significantly increases time overhead. In this paper, we propose a novel hardware/software cache timing channel mitigation method called fast selective flushing (FaSe), for enforcing cost-efficient temporal isolation in the L1 data cache.
FaSe collectively leverages a custom cache, a specialized cache flush instruction, and user inputs, to create two new flush mechanisms, which significantly reduce the flush-based mitigation time cost.