DELTA: DEsigning a steaLthy trigger mechanism for analog hardware Trojans and its detection Analysis
TimeWednesday, July 13th4:30pm - 4:50pm PDT
Location3006, Level 3
Event Type
Research Manuscript
Hardware Security: Attack and Defense
Hardware Security: Primitives, Architecture, Design & Test
DescriptionWe present a stealthy triggering mechanism that reduces the dependencies of analog hardware Trojans on the frequent toggling of the software-controlled nets. The trigger to activate the Trojan is generated by using a glitch generation circuit and the clock signal, which increases the selectivity and feasibility of the trigger signal. The realized Trojan is able to evade the state-of-the-art run-time detection (R2D2) and Built-In Acceleration Structure (BIAS) schemes. Further, the simulation results show that the proposed trigger circuit incurs a minimal overhead in side-channel footprints in terms of area, delay, and power.