PathFinder: Side Channel Protection through Automatic Leaky Paths Identification and Obfuscation
TimeTuesday, July 12th10:53am - 11:15am PDT
Location3006, Level 3
Event Type
Research Manuscript
Hardware Security: Primitives, Architecture, Design & Test
DescriptionIn this paper, we propose a tool, namely PathFinder, to automatically protect the design with low overhead and can be compatible with the commercial design flow. The tool first models the power profile of all logic cells and ranks them according to the leakage contribution. Then it identifies the leaky paths comprised of vulnerable cells, by analyzing their topological structure and leakage attributes. Thereafter, PathFinder will leverage hardware countermeasures such as random recharging or Boolean masking to prevent information leakage from these paths. The effectiveness of PathFinder is validated both through simulation and physical measurements on FPGA implementations.