Attacking the TimingCamouflage+ Algorithm
TimeWednesday, July 13th6pm - 7pm PDT
LocationLevel 2 Lobby
Event Type
Networking Reception
Work-in-Progress Poster
DescriptionIn today’s world, sending a design to a third party foundry for fabrication poses a serious threat to one’s intellectual property. To keep designs safe from adversaries, design obfuscation techniques have been developed to protect the IP details of the design. This paper explains how the previously considered secure algorithm, TimingCamouflage+, can be thwarted and the original circuit can be recovered. By removing wave-pipelining false paths, the TimingCamouflage+ algorithm is reduced to the TimingCamouflage algorithm. Since TimingCamouflage is vulnerable to the TimingSAT attack, this reduction proves that TimingCamouflage+ is also vulnerable. This paper describes how wave-pipelining paths can be removed.